Strategic complementarities in financial markets
It is often observed that successful investment requires each investor in a financial market to guess what other investors will do.
George Soros has called this need to guess the intentions of others '
reflexivity'.
[10] Similarly,
John Maynard Keynes compared financial markets to a
beauty contest game in which each participant tries to predict which model
other participants will consider most beautiful.
[11]
Furthermore, in many cases investors have incentives to
coordinate their choices. For example, someone who thinks other investors want to buy lots of
Japanese yen may expect the yen to rise in value, and therefore has an incentive to buy yen too. Likewise, a depositor in
IndyMac Bank who expects other depositors to withdraw their funds may expect the bank to fail, and therefore has an incentive to withdraw too. Economists call an incentive to mimic the strategies of others
strategic complementarity.
[12]
It has been argued that if people or firms have a sufficiently strong incentive to do the same thing they expect others to do, then
self-fulfilling prophecies may occur.
[13] For example, if investors expect the value of the yen to rise, this may cause its value to rise; if depositors expect a bank to fail this may cause it to fail.
[14] Therefore, financial crises are sometimes viewed as a
vicious circle in which investors shun some institution or asset because they expect others to do so.
[15]
Leverage
Leverage, which means borrowing to finance investments, is frequently cited as a contributor to financial crises
[citation needed]. When a financial institution (or an individual) only invests its own money, it can, in the very worst case, lose its own money. But when it borrows in order to invest more, it can potentially earn more from its investment, but it can also lose more than all it has. Therefore leverage magnifies the potential returns from investment, but also creates a risk of
bankruptcy. Since bankruptcy means that a firm fails to honor all its promised payments to other firms, it may spread financial troubles from one firm to another (see
'Contagion' below).
The average degree of leverage in the economy often rises prior to a financial crisis
[citation needed]. For example, borrowing to finance investment in the
stock market ("
margin buying") became increasingly common prior to the
Wall Street Crash of 1929.
Asset-liability mismatch
Another factor believed to contribute to financial crises is
asset-liability mismatch, a situation in which the risks associated with an institution's debts and assets are not appropriately aligned. For example, commercial banks offer deposit accounts which can be withdrawn at any time and they use the proceeds to make long-term loans to businesses and homeowners. The mismatch between the banks' short-term liabilities (its deposits) and its long-term assets (its loans) is seen as one of the reasons
bank runs occur (when depositors panic and decide to withdraw their funds more quickly than the bank can get back the proceeds of its loans).
[14] Likewise,
Bear Stearns failed in 2007-08 because it was unable to renew the short-term debt it used to finance long-term investments in mortgage securities.
In an international context, many emerging market governments are unable to sell bonds denominated in their own currencies, and therefore sell bonds denominated in US dollars instead. This generates a mismatch between the currency denomination of their liabilities (their bonds) and their assets (their local tax revenues), so that they run a risk of
sovereign default due to fluctuations in exchange rates.
[16]
Uncertainty and herd behavior
Many analyses of financial crises emphasize the role of investment mistakes caused by lack of knowledge or the imperfections of human reasoning.
Behavioral finance studies errors in economic and quantitative reasoning. Psychologist Torbjorn K A Eliazonhas also analyzed failures of economic reasoning in his concept of 'Ĺ“copathy'.
[17]
Historians, notably
Charles P. Kindleberger, have pointed out that crises often follow soon after major financial or technical innovations that present investors with new types of financial opportunities, which he called "displacements" of investors' expectations.
[18][19] Early examples include the
South Sea Bubble and
Mississippi Bubble of 1720, which occurred when the notion of investment in shares of company
stock was itself new and unfamiliar,
[20] and the
Crash of 1929, which followed the introduction of new electrical and transportation technologies.
[21] More recently, many financial crises followed changes in the investment environment brought about by financial deregulation, and the crash of the
dot com bubble in 2001 arguably began with "irrational exuberance" about Internet technology.
[22]
Unfamiliarity with recent technical and
financial innovations may help explain how investors sometimes grossly overestimate asset values. Also, if the first investors in a new class of assets (for example, stock in "dot com" companies) profit from rising asset values as other investors learn about the innovation (in our example, as others learn about the potential of the Internet), then still more others may follow their example, driving the price even higher as they rush to buy in hopes of similar profits. If such "herd behavior" causes prices to spiral up far above the true value of the assets, a crash may become inevitable. If for any reason the price briefly falls, so that investors realize that further gains are not assured, then the spiral may go into reverse, with price decreases causing a rush of sales, reinforcing the decrease in prices.
Regulatory failures
Governments have attempted to eliminate or mitigate financial crises by regulating the financial sector. One major goal of regulation is
transparency: making institutions' financial situations publicly known by requiring regular reporting under standardized accounting procedures. Another goal of regulation is making sure institutions have sufficient assets to meet their contractual obligations, through
reserve requirements,
capital requirements, and other limits on
leverage.
Some financial crises have been blamed on insufficient regulation, and have led to changes in regulation in order to avoid a repeat. For example, the Managing Director of the
IMF,
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, has blamed the financial crisis of 2008 on 'regulatory failure to guard against excessive risk-taking in the financial system, especially in the US'.
[23] Likewise, the New York Times singled out the deregulation of
credit default swaps as a cause of the crisis.
[24]
However, excessive regulation has also been cited as a possible cause of financial crises. In particular, the
Basel II Accord has been criticized for requiring banks to increase their capital when risks rise, which might cause them to decrease lending precisely when capital is scarce, potentially aggravating a financial crisis.
[25]
International regulatory convergence has been interpreted in terms of regulatory herding, deepening market herding (discussed above) and so increasing systemic risk.
[26] From this perspective, maintaining diverse regulatory regimes would be a safeguard.
Fraud
Fraud has played a role in the collapse of some financial institutions, when companies have attracted depositors with misleading claims about their investment strategies, or have
embezzled the resulting income. Examples include
Charles Ponzi's scam in early 20th century Boston, the collapse of the
MMM investment fund in Russia in 1994, the scams that led to the
Albanian Lottery Uprising of 1997, and the collapse of
Madoff Investment Securities in 2008.
Many
rogue traders that have caused large losses at financial institutions have been accused of acting fraudulently in order to hide their trades. Fraud in mortgage financing has also been cited as one possible cause of the 2008
subprime mortgage crisis; government officials stated on September 23, 2008 that the
FBI was looking into possible fraud by mortgage financing companies
Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac,
Lehman Brothers, and insurer
American International Group.
[27]
Contagion
Contagion refers to the idea that financial crises may spread from one institution to another, as when a bank run spreads from a few banks to many others, or from one country to another, as when currency crises, sovereign defaults, or stock market crashes spread across countries. When the failure of one particular financial institution threatens the stability of many other institutions, this is called
systemic risk.
[28]
One widely-cited example of contagion was the spread of the
Thai crisis in 1997 to other countries like
South Korea. However, economists often debate whether observing crises in many countries around the same time is truly caused by contagion from one market to another, or whether it is instead caused by similar underlying problems that would have affected each country individually even in the absence of international linkages.
Recessionary effects
Some financial crises have little effect outside of the financial sector, like the
Wall Street crash of 1987, but other crises are believed to have played a role in decreasing growth in the rest of the economy. There are many theories why a financial crisis could have a recessionary effect on the rest of the economy. These theoretical ideas include the '
financial accelerator', '
flight to quality' and '
flight to liquidity', and the
Kiyotaki-Moore model. Some
'third generation' models of currency crises explore how currency crises and banking crises together can cause recessions.
[29]